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Most  stakeholder-based  research  concerning  agri-environmental  schemes  (AES)  derives  from  work
engaging  with  farmers  and land  managers.  Consequently,  the  voices  and  opinions  of other  actors  involved
in  AES  tends to be unrepresented  in the  wider  literature.  One  group  of  actors  that  seem  particularly  over-
looked  in this  respect  are  private  (independent)  farm  advisors  (i.e.,  the  consultants  contracted  by  farmers
and  land  managers  to advise-on  AES  and  agronomic  matters).  To begin  to rectify  this  knowledge  gap  we
developed  an exploratory  online  survey  to  explore  private  farm  advisor  perspectives  in  the UK;  speciﬁ-
cally, the  situation  in  England  and  advisors’  experience  of  Natural  England’s  Environmental  Stewardship
programme.  A  total  of  251  Natural  England  registered  farm  advisors  (29.9%)  completed  our survey.  The
majority  of these  had  knowledge  and  expertise  in relation  to  two  (31.5%)  or three  (42.2%)  Environmental
Stewardship  schemes,  with  proﬁciency  in  ELS  (93.4%)  and  HLS  (82.8%)  being  the most  common.  On  aver-
age,  advisors  had  9.6 ± 5.6 yrs  of experience  and  operated  (75.3%)  in  a single  region  of  England.  Although
our  results  concentrated  upon  a relatively  simple  set  of  initial  topics  of  inquiry,  the survey  revealed  a
number  of interesting  ﬁndings.  Firstly;  for example,  that  in the  opinion  of  the  advisors  working  with  farm-
ers applying  for  Environmental  Stewardship  schemes,  the ’knowledge-exchange  encounter’  occurring
between  themselves,  their  clients  and  Natural  England  is  fundamental  to the  environmental  effective-
ness  of  these  schemes  as  well  as their  farm  business  compatibility.  Secondly,  respondents  suggested  that
beneath this  ‘encounter’  lie  tensions  arising  from  the  competing  agendas  and  objectives  of  the  different
actors  involved  which  can  affect  the  content  of  agreements;  for instance,  farmer  selection  of  management
options  versus  Natural  England’s  target  environmental  objectives.  Farm  advisors  suggested  that  they  had
to negotiate  this  balance  whilst  also  serving  the  needs  of their clients.  Thirdly,  respondents  raised  issues
concerning  the  complicated  nature  of  scheme  arrangements,  both  from  their  own  and farmers’  per-
spectives,  as well  as  the  adequacy  of payments  to cover  input  costs  and  matters  regarding  contractual
compliance,  all  of which  theyproposed  affected  farmer  participation.  Looking  ahead,  we believe  that
future  AES  should  account  for all of these  issues  in  their  design  to aid  long-term  farmer  participation,
effective agreement  implementation  and beneﬁcial  environmental  management.
©  2016  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ltd. This  is an open  access  article  under  the  CC BY  license. IntroductionDriven by a range of complex local and global drivers (e.g.,
lobalisation, food security concerns) food production and domes-
ic consumption patterns have undergone rapid transformations
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(e.g., FAO, 2003; OECD/FAO, 2011; Tscharntke et al., 2012; Poppy
et al., 2014). These changes have been accompanied by signiﬁcant
agricultural intensiﬁcation and extensiﬁcation (FAO, 2012, 2014;
Godfray and Garnett, 2014). Striking a balance between intensiﬁ-
cation and extensiﬁcation is a central challenge for modern food
production systems (Pretty et al., 2010; Balmford et al., 2012;
Grau et al., 2013). Without balance, environmental risks are high
and may  include deforestation and forest degradation, loss of bio-
diversity, soil erosion, decreased water quality, water shortages,
increases in greenhouse gas emissions and changes in biogeochem-
ical cycles (e.g., Gibbs et al., 2010; Quinton et al., 2010; Lambin
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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nd Meyfroidt, 2011; Lenzen et al., 2012; Mills Busa, 2013; WWAP,
014).
In Europe aspects of the agricultural sector have also undergone
 degree of intensiﬁcation (OECD, 2008), with concomitant reper-
ussions for ecosystems, biodiversity and water resources (e.g.,
scharntke et al., 2005; Billeter et al., 2008; Henle et al., 2008;
EA, 2010; Pe’er et al., 2014; Zanten et al., 2014). The continu-
ng problem European Union (EU) Member States face is trying to
aintain thriving and competitive agricultural and forestry sectors
hilst also ensuring a secure provision of environmental public
oods (Allen and Hart, 2013). In response, to resolve this tension,
ncentive-based management strategies such as agri-environment
chemes (AES) have been introduced throughout the EU (Deal et al.,
012; Lastra-Bravo et al., 2015; Lefebrve et al., 2015).
Initially optional, the 1992 MacSharry Reform of the Common
gricultural Policy (CAP) made AES a compulsory agricultural mea-
ure for all EU Member States; with further consolidation via
he Agenda 2000 Reform leading to their provision under Pillar
 of the CAP (European Commission, 2005; McCormack, 2012).
ssentially, AES operate through voluntary contractual agreements
nd provide farmers with payments in return for the delivery
f environmental public goods and services and/or the adoption
f modern environmentally-friendly farming practices (Garrod,
009; Lastra-Bravo et al., 2015; Lefebrve et al., 2015). Their imple-
entation is based on the subsidiarity principle, meaning that
ES are specially designed to negotiate the particular production-
onservation circumstances faced by individual Member States,
hich they achieve by addressing three intertwined matters,
amely: greening farming practices; reducing food production
mpacts on biodiversity and improving overall countryside man-
gement (European Commission, 2005; Smits et al., 2008; European
ourt of Auditors, 2011; McCormack, 2012; Allen and Hart, 2013;
urton and Schwarz, 2013).
Following their introduction in the UK in 1986 various versions
f AES have affected more than 6 million Ha of agricultural land
n England alone (Dobbs and Pretty, 2008; Gibbs, 2010; Tucker,
010). The most signiﬁcant recent variant, ‘Environmental Stew-
rdship’, began in 2005 (Chaplin and Radley, 2010). Its purpose—to
ffer a fresher, more radical, two-tiered approach to land man-
gement characterised as ‘broad and shallow’ and ‘narrow and
eep’ (Hart, 2010). The ‘broad and shallow’ tier was designed
s a non-competitive and open-access arrangement, while the
narrow and deep’ component was conﬁgured as a targeted and
ompetitive option for meeting priority environmental objectives
Boatman et al., 2010). In England, the Entry Level Stewardship
ELS) scheme represents the ‘broad and shallow’ approach, which
lso includes organic (OELS) and upland (UELS) variants, while
igher Level Stewardship (HLS) represents the ‘narrow and deep’
lement (Boatman et al., 2010; Jones et al., 2010; Supporting infor-
ation Table S1).
So, how effective are AES schemes at meeting their stated envi-
onmental goals? At both the European (e.g., Kleijn and Sutherland,
003; Kleijn et al., 2011) and UK (e.g., Whittingham, 2007; Boatman
t al., 2008; Defra and Natural England, 2008; Whittingham, 2011)
cale evidence suggests that their ability to provide environmental
nd conservation beneﬁts have been relatively mixed. In respect
f Environmental Stewardship the picture is similarly mixed, with
oth positive and negative impacts on the supply of environ-
ental beneﬁts identiﬁed. In particular, research has tended to
ocus on the biodiversity impacts of common in-ﬁeld, margin and
oundary options such as crop rotations, hedgerow management,
iparian buffer strips and winter stubble regimes on farmland birds
e.g., Davey et al., 2010a,b; Field et al., 2010; Hinsley et al., 2010;
iriwardena, 2010; Baker et al., 2012; Goodwin et al., 2013; Gruar
t al., 2013), and to lesser extents on ﬂoristic diversity (e.g., Still and
yﬁeld, 2010; Morris et al., 2010), insect pollinators (e.g., Fuentes-olicy 55 (2016) 240–256 241
Montemayor et al., 2011; Critchley et al., 2013; Dunn et al., 2013;
Peyton et al., 2013), natural resource management (e.g., Ramwell
and Boatman, 2010), and ecosystem services (e.g., Rollett et al.,
2008; FERA, 2012).
Beyond biodiversity, other analyses have demonstrated that
participation in Environmental Stewardship can deliver both
human and social capital gains (Mills, 2012), whilst also enhancing
local employment and boosting the rural economy (Courtney et al.,
2013). Yet, it has also been established that the ﬁnancial compen-
sation mechanism operated by Environmental Stewardship may
promote adverse selection as well as reduce the degree of environ-
mental beneﬁts secured (Fraser, 2009; Quillérou et al., 2011).
Concerning ourselves with the principal agents involved (e.g.,
farmers, land managers, independent farm advisors and Natural
England) in the implementation of Environmental Stewardship,
research has generally favoured addressing the farmer element:
focusing primarily on understanding the views of farmers (e.g.
FERA, 2013a) and their motivations for engagement in these
schemes (e.g. Mills et al., 2013) with little attention paid to inter-
mediaries (e.g., advisors)—particularly independent farm advisors.
Yet, drawing on evidence from payment for ecosystem service pro-
grammes (PES), a similar mechanism to AES, clearly demonstrates
the importance of external advisors – especially as facilitators of
agreement processes between participants and contracting author-
ities –− due to their capacity to provide specialist knowledge and
skills (e.g., Ferraro, 2008; Thuy et al., 2010; Lin and Nakamura, 2012;
Huber-Stearns et al., 2013; Martin-Ortega et al., 2013; Schomers
and Matzdorf, 2013; Hejnowicz et al., 2014).
In light of this, we  posited that examining the farm advisor
dimension would represent an important and justiﬁed avenue of
exploration. By improving our understanding of the views and
opinions of farm advisors regarding Environmental Stewardship,
it may  be possible to identify ways in which to improve the over-
all implementation and effectiveness of AES: aspects important
for achieving conservation objectives, public goods generation and
farm business viability. In this research on the English experience,
we report results from a survey designed to explore private farm
advisors’ views regarding their own  particular role in the deliv-
ery of Environmental Stewardship agreements as well as their
opinions concerning farmers, Natural England and other facets of
Environmental Stewardship scheme implementation and opera-
tionalisation.
Our online survey adopted an exploratory approach, delving
into the ‘world’ of the farm advisor and concentrated on: (i) advi-
sors’ views regarding scheme constraints and client motivations
and behaviours; (ii) advisors’ modes of interaction with their clients
and Natural England; (iii) the determinants inﬂuencing the con-
tent of individual agreements; (iv) mechanisms for balancing client
needs and the provision of sufﬁcient levels of environmental public
goods, and (v) recommendations for improving the delivery of AES.
It is important to point out that this investigation tells only part
of a much larger story. As such, it should be viewed as the starting
point, the ﬁrst stepping stone, to further, more in depth examina-
tions of the farm advisor role which by necessity would need to be
triangulate with the views of farmers, land managers and those of
Natural England.
2. Background: evidence to support our exploratory
approach
In concentrating on the areas (i–v) we were guided by evi-
dence highlighting key determinants of voluntary incentive scheme
operationalisation, implementation and effectiveness (e.g., Martin-
Ortega et al., 2013; Hejnowicz et al., 2014); the general purpose and
structure of AES (e.g., European Commission, 2005) and informed
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Fig. 1. Environmental Stewardship Framework co-opted and adapted from a PES model by Martin-Ortega et al. (2013). The UK/England Stewardship Scheme is placed within
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ajor  component parts (actors, contracts and service delivery) with each of these s
he  framework also emphasises general interactions occurring between componen
y the particular arrangements and speciﬁcations of individual
nvironmental Stewardship schemes (Natural England 2012a,b,c).
e combined these different strands to develop an Environmental
tewardship framework (Fig. 1) to guide our survey. Reﬂecting this,
he composition of our survey is underpinned by three major foci.
.1. Actors and their interactions
.1.1. Farmers: motivation, participation and knowledge
What motivates participants is important; indeed, it is central to
heir participation (Lastra-Bravo et al., 2015). Motivations under-
inning farmer and land manager decision-making processes have
een identiﬁed as a complex mosaic of extrinsic and intrinsic values
Siebert et al., 2006), as well as central to delivering effective AES
rogrammes (Mills et al., 2013). The choices farmers make seem
o be inﬂuenced by a range of external factors like environmen-
al policies; internal drivers such as personal characteristics (e.g.,
ge, education) and farm features, as well as interactive elements
elated to farm business arrangements and incentive design (Mills
t al., 2013). In particular, economic factors related to household
ncome, land tenure, family labour, and farm business structure
ppear to be particularly inﬂuential determinants of participation
Barreiro-Hurlé et al., 2010; Lastra-Bravo et al., 2015). These rep-
esent aspects frequently related to the need to maintain family
nd farm continuity (Farmar-Bowers and Lane, 2009; Ingram et al.,ar 1 and Pillar 2). The Environmental Stewardship programme is divided into three
uently subdivided into major constituent properties, characteristics and qualities.
ts as well as highlighting key interactions which are key foci of our survey.
2013). The extent to which this mix  of farm structural factors
and personal farmer characteristics inﬂuences AES participation is
affected by the likelihood of an agreement producing either major
or minor changes to farm operations, and consequently, the poten-
tial impacts these changes may  have on marginal proﬁts, the size
of transaction costs incurred and the level of utility derived from
the delivery of environmental goods and services (Barreiro-Hurlé
et al., 2010). Overall, as Siebert et al. (2006:319) note:
“There is an intricate interaction of contingencies affected by
locality and speciﬁc context, such as agronomic, cultural, social
and psychological factors, which [. . .]  play interwoven roles in
each [. . .]  speciﬁc farm context”.
Similarly, alongside motivation, knowledge underpins success-
ful agriculture but the types of knowledge required for engagement
in particular land management activities can vary substantially
(Winter, 1997). For example, as Ingram notes (2008a:224) in rela-
tion to farmers’ knowledge of soil management:
“. . .although farmers are largely knowledgeable many appear
to lack the [. . .]  knowledge necessary for carrying out more
complex [. . .]  management practices.”Environmental stewardship more generally has been shown to
enhance farmer skills and environmental knowledge, awareness
and appreciation (Mills, 2012).
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.1.2. Advisors and agencies
From this vantage the importance of both public and private
dvisory extension services and the advice they supply becomes
pparent (Lastra-Bravo et al., 2015). The role of external advisors
n bridging potential knowledge deﬁcits, acting as a necessary pre-
ondition for realizing effective voluntary incentive schemes, and
elivering successful public policy interventions are widely recog-
ised (Juntti and Potter, 2002; Cooper et al., 2009; Vesterager and
indegaard, 2012). Advisors are now required to explain regula-
ory processes and incentives as well as provide information and
raining (Vesterager and Lindegaard, 2012). Indeed, the evidence
hows that informed farmers are far more likely to participate in
ES (Lastra-Bravo et al., 2015). As Radley (2013) states, ‘good advi-
ors’ are central to the effectiveness of AES. Underscoring this point,
rivate advisors have been shown to positively impact the promo-
ion of both minor and major AES measures as well as inﬂuence
he willingness of farmers to adopt such measures (Lastra-Bravo
t al., 2015). Considered more generally, the evidence indicates that
he interactions between the actors (and agencies) involved in vol-
ntary incentive schemes, operating across different institutional
evels, as well as the degree of decentralisation and devolution in
ecision-making, are central to the functionality and effectiveness
f these interventions (e.g., Beckmann et al., 2009; Pascual et al.,
010; Legrand et al., 2013).
.2. Service delivery
.2.1. Management practices and the provision of public goods
The ﬁnancial rules and decision-making framing AES design are
entral to how AES achieve environmental outcomes, economic
fﬁciency and widespread uptake (Beckmann et al., 2009). At the
eart of AES lies the provision of public goods. The capacity of vol-
ntary management interventions to provide public goods rests
n the premise that the measures speciﬁed by these initiatives
re capable of generating the requisite environmental public goods
i.e. ecosystem services) at scale; and moreover, that participants
e.g., farmers) fully engage in implementing those management
ractices (Martin-Ortega et al., 2013; Hejnowicz et al., 2014). Essen-
ially, it is about ensuring schemes are capable of demonstrating
dditionality, or added value, over and above the business-as-usual
ase in the absence of any intervention (Ghazoul et al., 2010).
Supplying public goods is an essential function of the CAP; but
t the pan-European scale multiple environmental indicators sug-
est these are currently being undersupplied (Cooper et al., 2009;
e’er et al., 2014). With respect to Environmental Stewardship there
as been considerable discussion regarding ELS option manage-
ent uptake and distribution, the inference being that this directly
ffects their capacity to facilitate the provision of sufﬁcient envi-
onmental public goods (e.g., Hodge and Reader, 2010).
Optimal spatial targeting of management options is a key design
hallenge faced by incentive schemes (Wünscher et al., 2008). The
eluctance of many EU/UK farmers to engage in signiﬁcant envi-
onmental management has also been shown to inhibit uptake,
lthough certain activities are guaranteed under cross-compliance
Rollett et al., 2008). Mechanisms to counteract these behavioural
ispositions have been developed (Chaplin and Radley, 2010), such
s: restricted option choices under a directed ELS regime (Boatman,
013); focused initiatives like the ‘Making Environmental Steward-
hip More Effective’ programme (Blainey, 2013) and the Campaign
or the Farmed Environment (Gibbs, 2010). To varying degrees they
ave established that the delivery of environmental public goods
an be enhanced (Boatman, 2013; Clothier, 2013; Defra and Natural
ngland, 2013; Jones and Boatman, 2013). Taking the long view,
owever, there are those who argue that sustaining behaviouralolicy 55 (2016) 240–256 243
change that results in lasting environmental beneﬁts remains a
signiﬁcant challenge (Burton and Paragahawewa, 2011).
2.3. Contracts
2.3.1. Agreement arrangements and conditions
Connected to issues of uptake and public goods provision are
the other core elements of incentive scheme contracts, chieﬂy,
payments, monitoring and compliance (Danielsen et al., 2013;
Hejnowicz et al., 2014, 2015). The evidence clearly indicates that,
for schemes to be effective, the payments entrants receive must
be consistent with, and sufﬁcient to cover, the opportunity costs
they face through participation (Porras et al., 2013; Hejnowicz
et al., 2014). Consequently, in the case of AES, public agencies
need to ensure that payments cover the operational and invest-
ment costs, production and proﬁts foregone and private transaction
costs incurred by farmers (Falconer 2000; Mettepenningen et al.,
2009). This is important because, for example, regarding the issue
of transaction costs, not only do private transaction costs represent
a sizeable proportion of total AES-related costs but ﬁxed transaction
costs also act as a major contracting barrier (Falconer 2000; Ducos
et al., 2009; Mettepenningen et al., 2009). Financial incentives are
also key to farmers signing up to longer-term AES agreements,
entering schemes that are more prescriptive and joining schemes
with signiﬁcant layers of bureaucracy (Ruto and Garrod, 2009).
Hence the signiﬁcance of payments should not be underestimated,
as they directly impact overall income and the feasibility of par-
ticipation (Wunder et al., 2008) in addition to having fairness and
equity ramiﬁcations (Borner et al., 2010; Pascual et al., 2010).
Providing a sufﬁcient incentive also helps to ensure a higher
degree of compliance; whilst this is important the other major
factor that encourages greater compliance is the provision of con-
tracts with enforceable sanctions and penalties (Ferraro, 2008;
Wunder et al., 2008). Poor enforcement can often undermine
scheme performance (Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013). Enforcement
only works if there is an adequate monitoring regime in place, and
in the case of Environmental Stewardship schemes this is recog-
nised to require considerable improvement (Defra and Natural
England, 2008; Boatman et al., 2010; Chaplin and Radley, 2010;
Mountford et al., 2013; Radley, 2013). Collectively, these com-
plex institutional arrangements represent fundamental aspects of
the functioning and performance of any voluntary incentive pro-
gramme  (Hejnowicz et al., 2014, 2015).
3. Materials and methods
3.1. Data requirements
Our approach is exploratory. We  reasoned the most expedient
way to proceed to obtain a broad overview of farm advisors views
was to use an online survey. In addition, due to the large number
(>900) of Environmental Stewardship advisors this also seemed the
most ﬂexible and parsimonious choice. While interviews may  pro-
vide a far more extensive and nuanced description of farm advisor
views, we felt that it was important to gather information from as
wide a variety of advisors as possible: given potentially important
differences in opinions that might arise due to regional differences
in priorities or in differences among advisors who specialized in ELS
or HLS schemes. We  also anticipated that a broad-based approach
would identify speciﬁc issues and provide the necessary context to
conduct more focused qualitative interviews with farm advisors as
well as other agents in the process (e.g., farmers, Natural England
advisors) in the future.
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.2. Sample
The sample was composed of Natural England registered stew-
rdship advisors whose contact information, which was publically
vailable, we obtained from Natural England’s register.1 After
emoving duplicate entries the register included information for
58 individual advisors from eight regions of England (North East,
orth West, East Midlands, West Midlands, East of England, South
ast, South West, and Yorkshire & Humberside).
.3. Survey instrument
The survey was constructed with Sawtooth Software’s (www.
awtoothsoftware.com) SSI web-based interviewing platform. A
ilot survey was tested on 24 stewardship advisors, three from each
f eight regions; responses from the pilot informed the design of
he ﬁnal survey. The questions included in the survey explore those
ssues previously discussed in Section 2. The ﬁnal survey (Support-
ng information S2) consisted of 39 questions divided into three
arts. Most questions were closed, involving selection of radio but-
ons (single answers) or checkboxes (multiple answers) but several
uestions included space for providing extra comments.
More speciﬁcally, Part 1 requested advisors’ generic back-
round information, including expertise. Part 2 focused on the
rocess of generating a stewardship agreement and comprised
ub-sections covering advisors’ views regarding: client motivations
nd knowledge; agreement preparation and constraints; inter-
ctions with clients and Natural England; how advisors balance
armer needs and Natural England objectives; and recommen-
ations for improving environmental stewardship agreements in
ight of future changes to scheme delivery. Part 3 concentrated
n the environmental content of agreements, respondents’ views
egarding Natural England advisor amendments to submitted HLS
greements, and advisors’ perceptions of client understanding and
cceptance of scheme payment levels and sanctions. Importantly,
articipants were fully aware of what professional opinions were
eing asked of them and could decide to opt-out at any stage of the
urvey.
.4. Survey implementation
Following standard social science survey protocol (Dilman et al.,
009), Environmental Stewardship advisors were contacted up to
ve times over a period of ﬁve weeks: (8th October to 7 November,
013, with the survey open from 15 October to 15 November, 2013).
nvitation emails contained a unique hypertext link enabling advi-
ors to access the survey directly (Supporting information S3). Of
58 advisors from the register, we assumed that 840 had been
ontacted after adjusting for 118 non-delivery email notiﬁcations.
. Results and discussion
.1. Advisor characteristics
.1.1. Demographics, experience and regional distribution
A total of 354 respondents (42% of the sample) accessed the
nline survey platform and 251 (29.9%) completed the full survey
Supporting information Table S2). Given the number of completed
esponses, we can be fairly conﬁdent that the views expressed by
espondents in our ‘survey sample’ are broadly representative of
hose held by the ‘population sample’.
1 www.naturalengland.org.uk/ourwork/farming/funding/es/agents/register.
spx.olicy 55 (2016) 240–256
Respondents were asked to indicate the regions in which they
operated, in terms of commonality: 24.8% of indicated the South
West; 20.3% the West Midlands; 17.5% the East of England and
Yorkshire-Humberside; 16.3% the East Midlands and the South
East; 14.6% the North West; and 8.5% the North East. The major-
ity of respondents (75.3%) operated in one region, with only 14.0%,
5.6%, 2.8% and 2.0% working across two, three, four or ﬁve regions
respectively.
Relatedly, regions appeared to differ according to their degree of
advisor mobility (Supporting information Table S3). In some loca-
tions advisors demonstrated a more extensive ‘regional working
network’, operating across a number of different regions, whereas
in other cases these ‘networks’ were more limited. In the East Mid-
lands, for example, advisors exhibited the highest level of mobility
with 60.0% working across additional regions. In the South West, on
the other hand, just 24.6% of advisors operated outside their own
region.
Advisor experience ranged considerably: from one to thirty
years. However, the majority of respondents (56.5%) worked in
an advisory capacity for 9.6 ± 5.6 yrs, although a large minor-
ity (39.04%) were considerably more experienced with 10–20
years of practice. Respondents operating across more regions also
appeared to have longer experience as farm advisors, for example,
14.6 ± 2.0 yrs for those working across four and ﬁve regions com-
pared to 9.4 ± 0.4 yrs for those working in a single region. Generally
respondents indicated that they had knowledge and expertise in
relation to two  (31.5%) or three (42.2%) Environmental Steward-
ship schemes, with proﬁciency in ELS (93.4%) and HLS (82.8%) being
the most common (Supporting Information Table S4). There were
distinctive patterns of regional expertise (Supporting Information
Table S5), probably reﬂecting the different geographies of these
regions as well as the more limited application of some schemes
compared to others (e.g., upland versions of ELS compared to stan-
dard ELS schemes).
4.2. Agreement formation
4.2.1. Understanding clients: farmer motivations
Identifying the most common motivating factors leading farm-
ers and land managers to engage with Environmental Stewardship,
we found that advisors felt both extrinsic and intrinsic values
played a motivating role (Table 1). Evidence from previous research
indicates that farmers’ and land managers’ participation in vol-
untary agri-environment schemes is inﬂuenced by a variety of
attitudes and values (e.g. Siebert et al., 2006; Cross and Franks,
2007; Mills et al., 2013). Respondents ascribed a heterogeneity of
motivations to the decision-making processes underlying farmer
participation, this suggests connections to broader socio-cultural
norms, worldviews and goals (Ingram et al., 2013; Mills et al.,
2013)—advancing what Morris and Potter, 1995 term a ‘participa-
tion spectrum’.
Building on the existing literature (e.g., Wilson and Hart 2000,
2001; Siebert et al., 2006; Cross and Franks, 2007; Defrancesco
et al., 2008; Mills et al., 2013; Lastra-Bravo et al., 2015) our anal-
ysis of advisor opinions suggests that extrinsic values such as
those related to ﬁnancial gain, proﬁt maximization, long-term
security and capital investment represent the primary motivators
encouraging farmer and land manager engagement with envi-
ronmental stewardship. These observations accord with evidence
from UELS agreement holders suggesting that scheme payments
act as the principal motivating factors determining participation,
with additional agronomic concerns such as the degree of align-
ment with existing farm practices also inﬂuencing engagement
(CCRI, 2012). In this regard we  identiﬁed so-called ‘calculating’ (i.e.,
purely ﬁnancial), ‘opportunistic’ (i.e., income from existing prac-
tices), ‘optimizing’ (i.e., production potential of marginal land) and,
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Table  1
Stewardship advisor perceptions of client motivations.
Motivation classiﬁcationa,b Motivating factors
(key themes)
Primary reason
(%, n = 246)
Secondary reason
(%, n = 235)
Tertiary reason
(%, n = 153)
Extrinsic
Financial incentives (Cal) Economics (i.e. income, ﬁnance, money, cash,
payment, compensation)
64.6 8.9 5.9
Proﬁt  maximisation (Cal) Finance linked to farm viability and management 5.7 − −
Long-term security and farm viability (Opp) Continuation of current practices and extension of a
prior environmental scheme
4.5 9.8 5.9
Capital
invest-
ment
(Opt)
Use of unproductive marginal land (linkages to ﬁnance
and proﬁtability)
4.1 12.3 5.9
Finance linked to recouping monies from modulation 3.7 2.1 1.3
Income diversiﬁcation 1.22 2.1 −
Capital works (e.g. ﬁnance, investment and
enhancements)
– 6.4 6.5
General improvement in farm management and
operations
– 3.8 7.8
Increase farm value – 1.7 1.3
Community image & recognition in wider
society (Cat)
Prestige and public perception – − 1.9
Regulation (Com) Cross-compliance – 0.4 5.9
External non-regulatory obligation* Peer Pressure – 0.8 1.9
Encouragement from Natural England – 0.4 0.6
Intrinsic
Personal sense of environmental responsibility
and accountability (E)
Environmental beneﬁts (e.g. biodiversity, wildlife,
conservation, farm environment)
13.8 39.2 35.3
Environmental beneﬁts linked to improvements for
game and shooting
– 2.1 5.9
Obligation and responsibility (e.g. moral and
environmental aspect)
1.2 3.4 5.9
Commitment and interest in the
environment(E)
Personal satisfaction and interest – – 5.2
a Motivation classiﬁcations (i.e. extrinsic and intrinsic values) and sub-groupings are based on Mills et al. (2013).
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* This category is not identiﬁed by Mills et al. (2013) but emerged from responde
o a lesser extent, ‘compensatory’ (i.e., regulatory obligation) moti-
ating classiﬁcations as the primary drivers underlining farmer
articipation reinforcing previous analyses (e.g., Pike, 2008, 2013;
an Herzele et al., 2013).
Previous studies of AES participants have, for example, high-
ighted support for environmentally-oriented concepts such as
wildlife and environment’, ‘improving the landscape’ and ‘wildlife
onservation beneﬁts’ (CCRI, 2012; FERA, 2013a). Indeed, a positive
nvironmental attitude can be a component of farmers’ willing-
ess to engage with AES (Lastra-Bravo et al., 2015). Similarly,
espondents felt that intrinsic values were important secondary
nd tertiary motivators underlying Environmental Stewardship
ngagement, perhaps in this sense, complementing the more
idespread ﬁnancially-oriented motivations which they proposed
hat farmers hold: lending credence to the notion that extrinsic
nd intrinsic values need not be mutually exclusive (Mills et al.,
013). To an extent this may  help temper concerns that without sig-
iﬁcant intrinsic motivations farmers lack the necessary incentive
o deliver long-lasting environmental management improvements
Van Herzele et al., 2013).
.2.2. Farmers’ knowledge and advisor advice
Farmers’ capacity to undertake on-farm environmental man-
gement, in part, relies on their knowledge, skills and understand-
ng of those management requirements, although competencies
an vary signiﬁcantly between individuals (Ingram, 2008a). Conse-
uently, there is a growing recognition that the provision of advice,
nd the role of advisor, is central for helping farmers negotiate the
rogressively more complex demands of environmental manage-
ent and agricultural production (Ingram, 2008b).nistic) and (Opt, Optimising) are categories referring to modes of agri-environment
explanations.
ments.
The majority of respondents (60.0%) indicated that 50% or more
of their clients had a clear notion of the stewardship scheme
they wished to enter. However, only 27.6% of respondents agreed
that a similar proportion of their clients also understood the
intricacies of agreement arrangement (i.e. with particular refer-
ence to the application process)—in this case advisors may  have
been referring to clients that were renewing agreements (FERA,
2013a). Interestingly, respondents’ views to both of these questions
also demonstrated a degree of regional variation, suggesting the
importance of context, although the over-arching picture remained
reasonably consistent (Supporting information Table S6). From an
advisor perspective, the assertion that famers express strong views
regarding the schemes they wish to enter yet demonstrate more
limited understanding of scheme-related processes and procedures
should not, perhaps, be a surprise—after all one of the reasons
famers employ independent advisors is to help navigate the com-
plexity of scheme arrangements (Vesterager and Lindegaard, 2012).
For example, as one respondent (id: GRFPA2) remarked:
“Most clients have a general idea of which scheme they would
like to enter (i.e. ELS or ELS & HLS) and the majority know the
basic options available under ELS & HLS. But I have not met  one
client yet who has read each handbook (160 pages + in each)
from cover to cover before I meet them so they do not realise the
complexities involved, particularly in HLS, nor do they always
realise the restrictions/requirements involved in the manage-
ment of some of the options. This always surprises me because
I would always want to know the details of something I would
be committing to for 10 years especially given the ﬁnancial and
management implications.”
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In light of this, it is hardly unexpected to ﬁnd that; over-
ll, respondents regarded their own advice as either ‘important’
37.2%) or ‘very important’ (53.2%) for steering their clients towards
he most suitable Environmental Stewardship schemes. Perhaps
ore surprising was the gender split between advisors, with 63.4%
f female respondents regarding their advice as ‘very important’
ompared to 46.3% of their male counterparts. The reason for this
pparent gender-based difference is unclear, though it does sug-
est that the potential role of gender in shaping professional advice
eeds further exploration.
What we can say, however, is that although we expect respon-
ents to validate their own importance, the evidence seems to
uggest that the advice farmers receive can be beneﬁcial. For
nstance, information from UELS agreement holders points to
pplicants requiring substantial amounts of advice (CCRI, 2012).
ikewise for ELS participants, salient advice has been shown to
e essential for enabling farmers to fulﬁl particular environmen-
al management obligations (Lobley et al., 2010). Thematic analysis
f additional open-ended comments not only supports this claim,
ut further extends it by revealing the wide variety of reasons farm
dvisors feel their advice is necessary for aiding farmer decision-
aking (Supporting information Table S7). These reasons include
nsuring farmers select the most appropriate type of stewardship
cheme and suite of environmental options; as respondent (id:
V3PZG) clearly stated:
“Farmers are not aware of all the options on offer for each
scheme (particularly HLS) and therefore which ones best suit
their farm and farming practices. They are also not aware of all
the management prescriptions in HLS as these are not in the
handbook.”
They also reﬂect the opinion that farmers recognise the need
or technical input and appreciate, trust and prefer independent
dvice; indeed, as one farm advisor (id: 5GHHXD) put it:
“They [that is the farmer] prefer private advice rather than Nat-
ural England sponsored/contracted advisors as they rather pay
for impartial advice than possibly receive bias advice.”
There’s also a sense that respondents see their advice has hav-
ng wider signiﬁcance for their client’s farming system too; a view
dvanced by respondent (id: ZJGWWD):
“. . .other factors that ‘farmers’ need to consider and reﬂect on
including tax implication of dual use and on their single pay-
ment, how their business structure is arranged [. . .],  the working
and timing of operations at the commencement of the agree-
ment, implications particularly under the HLS regarding the
reversion of arable to grass under several options that can affect
the capital value of their land. . .”
Many of these views are reinforced by farmers themselves (CCRI,
012; FERA, 2013a).
.3. Agreement practicalities
.3.1. Application complexity
Respondents noted the variation in application comple-
ion times (to the point of submission) between ELS, OELS
nd UELS schemes, on the one hand, and HLS on the other
Table 2)—illustrating the different labour demands these schemes
ave. The majority of respondents (88.4%) indicated that ELS appli-
ations take 1–3 months to complete, while 51.6% thought that
ompletion times of between 4–9 months were more common for
LS. ELS agreements could sometimes be completed within a few
ays or weeks because of the efﬁciency of the ELS online appli-
ation system. According to open-ended survey responses, majorolicy 55 (2016) 240–256
thematic factors contributing to the longer completion times of HLS
agreement included: the requirement for detailed surveys (i.e., the
Farm Environment Plan [FEP]); farm complexity and holding size;
the need for meetings with Natural England (as well as Natural
England’s capacity and decision-making); draft agreement checks;
problems associated with rural land registry mapping, and obtain-
ing historic environment record reports promptly. As one advisor
(id: YMEVCN) commented:
“For ELS schemes; the application process is usually very quick
− the application forms are available immediately online (or
within a week on paper) then they usually take just a few
hours to complete. Natural England then process the applica-
tion to Agreement within 6 to 8 weeks. For HLS; often ﬁrst
contact is made up to or over a year in advance of the start
of the Agreement. After this, the FEP must be carried out at the
most appropriate time (e.g., mid-late June in species rich hay
meadows or March/April on breeding wader ground). It’s then
necessary to delay the submission of the application until after
the FEP has been completed and approved (easily 8 to 12 weeks).
It can then be another 8 to 12 weeks from the Agreement to
be drawn-up by the HLS Adviser and studied in detail by the
applicant before it goes live.”
The complexity of the application process represents a signif-
icant issue in the design and effectiveness of HLS, in particular,
the task of undertaking and producing the FEP (Defra and Natural
England, 2008). Yet 74.4% of respondents agreed that the FEP was
‘important’ or ‘very important’ to the subsequent design of HLS
agreements. In addition, 57.6% of respondents indicated that the
advice delivered by the FEP grant to farmers and land managers was
‘effective’ or ‘highly effective’. The centrality of FEP to construct-
ing agreements was  conﬁrmed in an HLS monitoring programme
(FERA, 2013b; Mountford et al., 2013).
Open-ended comments provided a mixture of views with some
respondents arguing the value of the FEP, especially its usefulness
for: mapping features and selected options; indicating the value
of a holding; enabling advisors to advise on marginal areas of the
holding and become familiar with the whole farm; and providing
the ecological evidence base to support the correct choice of HLS
options and indicators. As advocated by respondent (id: RG5J9W)
the FEP represents a:
“Very useful exercise for the adviser to get a really good under-
standing of the farm, what is there and the farming system in
place: it gives you the knowledge to sit down with the farmer
and talk knowledgeably about their farm and make suggestions,
also great to be able to tell them something they don’t know
and helps to build a good relationship for developing a quality
scheme.”
On the other hand, some took a more critical stance citing that
the FEP was too time-consuming to produce and collected too much
unnecessary information (FERA, 2013b). For example, as respon-
dent (id: FJMNC3) notes succinctly:
“I completed a FEP for a farm. . .where over 75% of the FEP was
irrelevant to the plan that was ﬁnally agreed. Natural England
knows what it wants to focus on − there is no point in wasting
time mapping areas that are irrelevant to a future scheme.”
Still, others claimed that the FEP was not always read in detail by
Natural England project ofﬁcers; did not properly consider the farm
business, and was not used following approval − a view articulated
by respondent (id: LDHK8D):“We  get the impression that the FEP is not read in detail by many
NE project ofﬁcers, and that the end stewardship agreement is
worked up by verbal discussion rather than by close reference
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Table  2
Average time taken by respondents to complete Environmental Stewardship agreements (applications).
ES Scheme (% of Advisors, n = 250)
1–3 months 4–6 months 7–9 months 10–12 months 1 year + I don’t know
ELS 88.4 4.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 6.8
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rOELS  57.2 4.8 
U(O)ELS 39.6 4.0
HLS  20.4 30.4 2
to the FEP − hence I rate the FEP as ‘important’, but not ‘very
important’.”
To some extent these views leave a question mark over whether
fforts to simplify FEP methodology and recording have been as
uccessful as originally envisaged (Defra and Natural England,
008).
Cost and time were identiﬁed as the most common principal
onstraints relating to the preparation and submission of Environ-
ental Stewardship applications (Table 3). Administrative burdens
agnify the transaction costs of HLSs, particularly due to labour-
ntensive activities such as the FEP. Past surveys of both ELS and
ELS agreement holders highlighted that the bureaucracy and com-
lexity of schemes are perceived as daunting and can reduce the
umber of potential applicants (Cross and Franks, 2007; CCRI, 2012;
ERA, 2013a). Reducing scheme complexity and procedures is the
ost effective means of curtailing transaction costs and increasing
ES uptake by farmers (Mettepenningen et al., 2009). In this survey,
2.5% of respondents ‘somewhat agreed’ or ‘highly agreed’ that the
LS process needed to be simpliﬁed, while a further 80.2% agreed
hat farmers and land managers perceived the process of apply-
ng for environmental stewardship (in particular HLS) as too time
onsuming and complicated. This resonates with requests to make
uture Rural Development Programme funding applications far
impler and manageable through, for example, improving available
uidance and streamlining application processes and requirements
Defra, 2013).
.3.2. Advisor roles
Our analysis indicated that respondent interaction (i.e., com-
unication) differed according to agreement type and the
orresponding actor. Respondents noted that all Environmental
tewardship schemes involved signiﬁcant client interaction. How-
ver, respondents indicated that ELS, OELS and U(O)ELS schemes
nvolved less client interaction (64.8%–77.6% ‘high’ to ‘very high’)
ompared to HLS schemes (95.5% ‘high’ to ‘very high’).
In the context of a ‘knowledge exchange encounter’ (Ingram,
008b) studies of advisor-farmer interactions have previously
mphasised the power imbalance in that relationship, char-
cterising the advisor as a prospective exploiter; however,
ollowing signiﬁcant privatisation of advisory services farmer
emand is potentially reframing that asymmetric power dynamic
Ingram, 2008b). Respondents suggested that interactions between
hemselves and their clients proceeded based on mutual decision-
aking (62.0%), or to a lesser extent according to their own
equirements (27.0%). Advisors described their interactions with
lients mainly in terms of client need (54.0%); with the frequency of
nteractions being mainly ‘sufﬁcient’ (40.8%) and/or ‘above average
ompared to other professionals’ (28.8%).
The emerging narrative suggests that agreement preparation is
ot simply a series of box ticking exercises and procedures but also
 social process. As Ingram (2008b:414) noted, with respect to the
elational interaction between farmers and agronomists:“. . .the practice the farmer implements is a negotiated or facil-
itated outcome between agronomists and farmer rather than a
rigid prescriptive practice “‘adopted’” by the farmer.”0.0 0.0 36.8
1.2 0.4 53.2
8.8 5.6 13.6
Reinforcing this view, most respondents (80.0%) described the
process of agreement preparation as a negotiation between client
needs and their expert advice, with clients being relatively ﬂexible
on the type of scheme (49.2%) and environmental objectives (56.1%)
they would adopt. For example, as one advisor (id: D77SEQ) noted:
“Negotiation is the key to success − one needs to be able to
understand the farm, the farmer and then the reasons for being
invited and work out a scheme that will achieve success for both
parties.”
Indeed, the overwhelming majority of advisors (92.0%) indi-
cated that clients demonstrated a high degree of openness towards
their advice. This suggests that farmers are a relatively pragmatic
group – open to being persuaded on a range of possible recommen-
dations concerning the type and composition of the agreements
they enter – and that in this respect advisors can have an important
role in guiding farmer-decision making processes. For example, evi-
dence from UELS agreement holders suggests that a ﬁfth of their
option uptake is a result of external advice (CCRI, 2012). Likewise,
ELS agreement holders have previously stated that advice is:
“. . .very useful for both option choice and option management”
(FERA, 2013a:5).
In comparison with their clients, the levels interaction respon-
dents had with Natural England advisors were substantially lower
for ELS, OELS and UELS schemes (8.4% to 11.7% very low to
low) but remained similar for HLS (82.0% high to very high).
The vast majority (92.7%) of advisors indicated that they knew
they could contact Natural England for information and advice if
and when required. Their reasons for doing so were many and
varied (Table 4); however, thematic analysis indicated that they
were commonly related to issues concerning: clariﬁcation and
guidance on scheme options, appropriateness and suitability; Nat-
ural England requirements/expectations for the farm area and
application-related issues, details and administrative checks (e.g.
help, advice, speciﬁc codes, vendor numbers etc.). Overall, addi-
tional comments veriﬁed that observed differences in the levels
of interaction respondents had with clients and Natural England
reﬂected the underlying complexity of the Environmental Stew-
ardship schemes.
4.4. Environmental stewardship performance
4.4.1. Public goods: promoting environmental objectives in entry
level stewardship
Delivering public goods implies a degree of spatial optimisation
to generate the requisite magnitude and distribution of environ-
mental beneﬁts (Garrod et al., 2012). There has been widespread
discussion regarding the effectiveness of ELS option uptake and
management activities in relation to realizing environmental ben-
eﬁts and value for money (Defra and Natural England, 2008; Hodge
and Reader, 2010; Jones et al., 2010). In particular, arguments for
increased integration of options across the landscape have been
proposed (Chaplin and Radley, 2010), with research suggesting that
farmers would buy into collaborative AES (Emery and Franks, 2012;
McKenzie et al., 2013).
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Table 3
Common constraints (C) identiﬁed by respondents in relation to Environmental Stewardship application preparation and submission processes.
Constraints (Emergent Themes) C1 (%, n = 248) C2 (%, n = 211) C3 (%, n = 145) C4 (%, n = 76) C5 (%, n = 40)
Cost (e.g. for clients) 20.6 15.6 4.8 3.9 2.5
Time  (e.g. application preparation and submission) 34.7 16.1 6.9 6.6 2.5
Time  and cost 6.1 3.8 1.4 0.0 0.0
Costs  versus potential rewards of scheme participation 3.2 1.9 2.1 3.9 0.0
Costs  associated with implementing scheme options 0.0 4.3 3.5 6.6 2.5
Suitability and alignment with current farming practices (e.g. extent to which
farming practices may need to be altered)
8.5 6.6 4.8 5.3 7.5
Farmer preferences, decision-making and expectations of scheme beneﬁts 2.4 1.9 4.1 1.3 0.0
Farmer willingness to engage in the application process and implement
scheme requirements
1.6 7.1 6.2 7.9 17.5
Farmer understanding, knowledge and awareness of schemes 0.4 2.4 4. 2.6 2.5
Scheme capacity to be effective and inherent limitations (e.g. environmental
option choices and ﬂexibility)
2.4 7.6 11.7 14.5 10.0
Scheme complexity (e.g. in preparation and implementation) 2.4 4.7 14.5 10.5 10.0
Mapping, visualisation tools, information procurement and surveying 5.6 3.3 8.3 2.6 5.0
Natural England 2.8 8.0 8.9 7.9 10.0
Farm  limitations and suitability (e.g. size and features) 3.6 3.8 2.8 13.2 0.0
Bureaucracy (e.g. red tape) 0.8 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0
Scheme funding availability (e.g. in relation to capital works) 0.4 0.5 2.8 2.6 0.0
Other  4.0 9.0 8.9 7.9 27.5
Table 4
Common reasons (R) respondents identiﬁed for contacting Natural England during agreement preparation.
Emergent Themes R1 (%, n = 237) R2 (%, n = 201) R3 (%, n = 144) R4 (%, n = 59) R5 (%, n = 20)
Clariﬁcation and guidance on scheme options, appropriateness and suitability 23.2 16.4 13.2 8.5 20.0
Target  options, priorities and features for the local area 6.3 6.0 2.8 1.7 –
Mapping-related issues 8.0 4.0 3.5 5.1 –
Natural England requirements/expectations for the farm area 12.7 6.5 2.8 6.8 5.0
Permission, approval and success of submitted application 3.8 2.0 2.1 – –
Application-related issues, details and administrative checks (e.g. help, advice,
speciﬁc codes, vendor numbers etc.)
10.5 7.0 4.9 10.2 10.0
Farm-related features, characteristics and aspects for inclusion in applications 9.3 4.5 5.6 1.7 5.0
Information related to previous applications and current
on-farm/neighbouring farm schemes in operation (i.e. practices,
compatibility etc.)
4.2 5.0 4.2 – –
Budgetary availability, ﬂexibility and constraints 2.1 2.5 4.2 1.7 –
Clariﬁcation of scheme rules and regulations 2.5 1.5 0.7 1.7 –
FEP/FER/HER related matters 2.5 4.0 8.3 3.4 5.0
Time  scale of application submission/deadlines 1.7 3.5 5.6 6.8 5.0
Time  scale for management options 0.4 – – – –
Time  to meet clients 0.4 0.5 – 1.7 5.0
Information and discussions regarding designated sites 1.3 3.0 1.4 5.1 –
Software/technical issues 0.4 0.5 – 1.7 –
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ELS schemes are designed to achieve ﬁve broad environmental
bjectives: wildlife conservation (WC); landscape quality & char-
cter (LQ & C—particularly in relation to water); protection of the
istoric environment (PHE); natural resource conservation (NRC,
articularly in relation to soil) and climate mitigation and adapta-
ion (CM & A). We  asked respondents to identify the environmental
bjectives most frequently met  by the agreements they have been
nvolved with (Table 5). Clearly, there are some that appear to be
eing met  more than others. This suggests differences in the way
greements fulﬁl speciﬁc objectives and provide a comprehensive
ange of environmental beneﬁts (Radley, 2013).
able 5
nvironmental objectives fulﬁlled by Environmental Stewardship agreements.
Environmental objectives Presence in stewardship application (%, n = 25
WC 94.0 
LQ  & C 87.2 
PHE  67.2 
NRC  48.8 
CM  & A 4.8 2.0 4.9 5.1 5.0
2.0 1.4 – –
1.5 1.4 3.4 –
For example, 94.0% of respondents indicated that most ELS
schemes in which they have been involved fulﬁl WC  objectives,
whereas only 4. 8% identiﬁed CM & A as being similarly fulﬁlled. This
trend is also observed at the regional scale. It appears most appli-
cations (48.0%) focus on WC,  LQ & C and PHE or WC,  LQ & C and NRC
(27.6%) environmental objectives. This supports previous agree-
ment holder surveys indicating that ‘farmland wildlife’, ‘wildlife
conservation beneﬁts’ and ‘resource protection’ were important
environmental issues affecting agricultural land (FERA, 2013a).
To some extent variations in meeting particular environmental
objectives may  be a reﬂection of the outcomes of directed fund-
ing streams. For example, signiﬁcant investments (approximately
0) Commonly met  environmental objectives (%)
WC,  LQ & C, PHE 48.0
WC,  LQ & C, NRC 27.6
WC,  PHE, NRC 11.2
LQ & C, PHE, NRC 4.0
– –
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200 million) have been channelled towards historic environment
onservation activities since 2005 (Natural England, 2014). They
ay  also be a consequence of sectoral variation in agreement and
ption uptake (Defra and Natural England, 2008).
It is certainly the case that most respondents (87.0%) regard their
ole as achieving the ‘best’ agreement for their client. What ‘best’
ctually refers to needs further exploration; however, in this con-
ext there is the potential for farmer-advisor co-alignment: either
o increase or decrease the environmental ambition of an agree-
ent. One argument raised is that when advisors want to avoid
osing the trust of farmers or negatively impacting farmer incomes
hey may  focus on bolstering current on-farm agricultural prac-
ices (e.g., Sutherland et al., 2013). For instance, as respondent (id:
RAV9H) stated:
“I see my  role as trying to ﬁt the scheme with the farming prac-
tices/available labour/capabilities & experience of the applicant.
My aim is to enhance them all, and to ensure the success of them
all.”
The majority of respondents (51.4%) stated that 50% or more
f the applications they had been involved with included speciﬁc
nvironmental objectives based on their priority status, implying
hat advisors strongly argued for the environmental component
nd/or that those farmers regarded this as important. As one ardent
green’ thinking advisor (id: TGGE35) commented:
“I try to only work with those people that are truly engaged
with the principles of Stewardship. If they are constantly trying
to ﬁnd ways out of doing what is necessary I explain that I can’t
help them and leave.”
However, for a signiﬁcant minority (48.59%) this was not the
ase, suggesting that advisors either failed to effectively promote
nd push the environmental argument or, that even if a forceful
rgument was presented; farmers considered other factors to be of
reater bearing on their decision-making. A sentiment supported
y respondent (id: 725VQ8) who acknowledge that:
“It depends if you are tuned into each other’s objectives. I do
this with the aim of improving and promoting good environ-
mentally sound farming practice − which has been in serious
decline since the 80s. If my  clients are similarly inclined, my
advice is important and relevant. If they are not of the same
opinion, my  advice/persuasion falls on deaf ears and is of little
importance.”
Regarding the latter, although we suggested in Section 4.3.2
hat advisors were well placed to inﬂuence farmer decision-
aking – given the level of openness to advice they purportedly
emonstrated – respondents identiﬁed a range of other signiﬁcant
arm-related factors that strongly affected farmers’ decision-
aking rationale to include/exclude speciﬁc management options.
he most commonly identiﬁed reasons advisors noted were those
onnected to farm system compatibility. For example, environmen-
al objectives are easy to implement (88.4%); is/are an extension
f current farm practices (84.3%), do not signiﬁcantly impact on
he day to day farm routine (84.3%), provide a higher points
alue (67.1%) and requires few man  hours (49.4%). Advisors seem
o be indicating that farmers are predisposed towards selecting
ptions that do not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence their farm business
FERA, 2013a), bolstering the idea that the primary predictors of
ption uptake are agricultural related factors (Hodge and Reader,
010). Moreover, it supports the generally articulated view of AES
hat there is a:“. . .disjuncture between the policy’s supposedly overarching
environmental rationale and its realisation in practice througholicy 55 (2016) 240–256 249
the actions and behaviours of land managers” (Juntti and Potter,
2002:216).
On the other hand, 80.0% of respondents also agreed that
in preparing ELS and HLS agreements they needed to balance
both client and Natural England needs. However, overall, opin-
ion was split as to whether a stewardship agreement reﬂected
the preferences of their clients or the priorities of Natural Eng-
land. Nevertheless, when viewed through the lens of gender and
expertise differences did emerge. For example, a higher percent-
age of male respondents (46.3%) compared to female respondents
(30.7%) agreed that agreements were more reﬂective of client pref-
erences than Natural England. In fact; on this issue, the distribution
of responses between male and female advisors was  signiﬁcantly
different (H(2) = 7.56, df = 1, p = 0.006). However, when considering
advisor expertise, those with wider experience of Environmen-
tal Stewardship schemes were more inclined to disagree with
this position (44.7–54.3%) compared to those with less expertise
(30.0–33.8%).
Importantly, 53.2% of respondents acknowledged that there was
an inherent conﬂict between client needs and Natural England pri-
orities, a pattern similarly observed if disaggregated by gender and
expertise. This is signiﬁcant, because it points toward an inherent
tension in how agreements meet their statutory obligations whilst
acknowledging that, to some degree, they must also co-align with
farmer and land manager needs. Although it would require further
investigation, it is conceivable that these various decision-making
trade-offs may  contribute to the skewed pattern of option uptake
observed elsewhere (e.g., Boatman et al., 2007; Jones et al., 2010;
Radley, 2013).
To an extent our results add weight to the contention that the
voluntary nature of Environmental Stewardship schemes, and their
option menus, predispose farmers to undertake only those environ-
mental management activities that would have occurred in their
absence (i.e., a lack of additionality); speciﬁcally, by subscribing to
those practices that ﬁt easily into existing farm activities − leading
to the possibility of adverse selection in option choices where the
envisaged level of environmental beneﬁts cannot be guaranteed
(Hodge and Reader, 2010). For example, research has found that:
“. . .farmers thought that 61% of features in ELS option would
be managed the same if they had not gone into ELS” (FERA,
2013a:9).
And furthermore, that between 21% and 52% of management
work, in ﬁnancial terms, would have occurred ‘in the absence of
the scheme’ (Courtney et al., 2013).
4.4.2. Alteration of agreements: the case of HLS
A profusion of advisory services stretching across public and
private sectors presents both challenges and opportunities: a plu-
ralistic resource of diverse competencies enriching advice and
extending the ‘agricultural knowledge system’; yet also providing
an opportunity for fragmentation, duplication, and incoherence in
policy and delivery; encouraging greater competition between ser-
vice providers and leading to confusion amongst farmers (Juntti and
Potter, 2002; Sutherland et al., 2013). How these play out in prac-
tice can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the environmental performance of
agreements (Sutherland et al., 2013).
It is reasonable to posit that there are different points in the Envi-
ronmental Stewardship process where the content of agreements
can be revised. First, there are those opportunities that arise dur-
ing agreement preparation, speciﬁcally, in relation to the dialogue
between farmers, private advisors, and Natural England ofﬁcers.
Second, alterations can be made to applications post-submission
when they are being reviewed by Natural England (here we  are
particularly referring to HLS applications). At this juncture, it is pos-
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ible that agreements may  be altered to favour Natural England’s
nvironmental agenda and priorities—potentially shifting the pre-
ubmission content away from more farmer-centric interests.
With this in mind, we asked respondents with experience of
LS agreements (n = 212) to comment on the extent to which
atural England advisors made alterations to the environmental
ontent of HLS applications between the original and ﬁnal approved
pplication. Although some respondents (17.9%) speciﬁed that Nat-
ral England advisor decisions did not lead to any alterations
n environmental content, the majority of respondents indicated
hat the environmental management composition of applications
as either ‘somewhat different’ (40.1%) or ‘moderately different’
38.7%). Notably, from the standpoint of transparency, a majority
f respondents (56.3%) declared that Natural England ‘very often’
r ‘always’ informed them about changes that had been made:
“I have without exception found the Natural England advisors
very helpful and communicative at all stages of the long pro-
cess it takes to put an application into practice.” (Respondent
id: WSGZAM)
Listing reasons as to why Natural England advisors altered the
nvironmental content of submitted HLS applications, respondents
xpressed a range of views with several themes emerging (Table 6).
he most frequently cited themes related to changes in Natural Eng-
and’s environmental agenda (23.7%), ﬁnancial and cost constraints
20.3%), and the calibre of Natural England advisors (11.6%).
It is possible, of course, that Natural England modiﬁcations to
LS applications do improve their environmental content:
“I work very closely with Natural England and know advisors
personally. Although they work to targets they seem to aim for
the best ‘wildlife’ options overall.” (Respondent id: HT2RJQ)
Furthermore, a previous assessment of 174HLS agreements
ndicated that they were generally ‘well designed’ with 80%
f agreements deemed likely to be effective in achieving most
utcomes: in each of these cases it is likely that there was  consid-
rable Natural England oversight in the delivery of these schemes
Mountford et al., 2013). Conversely, extensive prescriptive revi-
ions to AES have been shown to produce ‘excessive uniformity’ in
abitat management which can undermine biodiversity as well as
egatively affect farmer participation (Radley, 2013). The impact
n farmers may  be potentially quite severe, as respondent (id:
NUE5U) strongly argued:
“Often the client has already committed to a huge expense to
undertake the scheme that they feel they have to accommodate
the changes in order to achieve a return. Many are bullied into
the changes. This is ineffective as it doesn’t take into account if
the changes can be managed effectively which can lead to failure
in the long term.”
The majority of respondents (87.9%) expressed the opinion that
hey should be included in the discussions leading to changes
n ﬁnalized HLS agreements. Similarly, 82.2% of respondents dis-
greed with the notion that it was appropriate for Natural England
o make modiﬁcations to HLS applications without their input (Sup-
orting Information Table S8). For some advisors involvement is a
uestion of process and procedure:
“If Natural England discuss with advisor then the advisor can
understand the rationale and will be able to use advice on other
applications. Sometimes the discussions with Natural England
can lead to them reverting to original option.” (Respondent id:
3US4XH)
Yet, for other respondents, it is about mitigating inefﬁciencies
nd the potential straining of relations:olicy 55 (2016) 240–256
“I’ve had farmers very upset not understanding the changes
and then creating a silly 3 way  discussion where it is not easy
to know exactly what has been said. It makes sense to have a
proper open communication system. The farmer has employed
me,  why suddenly change to excluding the agent. This varies
according to the NE ofﬁcer.” (Respondent id: TFEPJJ)
Nevertheless, Natural England is the statutory authority in
charge of implementing Environmental Stewardship and as such
oversees the ﬁnal decisions regarding individual applications—they
represent the legitimate institutional authority. It is interesting,
therefore, that advisors should feel entitled to have a greater inﬂu-
ence over Natural England decision-making. The reasons behind
this require further investigation.
Linked to these comments, 60.8% of respondents viewed Natu-
ral England’s modiﬁcations of HLS agreements as not made in the
interests of their clients. In fact, 68.8% of respondents thought that
revisions to HLS applications were made to favour Natural Eng-
land interests (Supporting information Table S8). This point was
forcefully conveyed by one advisor (id: MLZEYT) who commented
that:
“In my  experience they are ALWAYS made to save money and
not in the best interests of the client or the environment and,
if truth be known, not in the best interests of Natural England
either in the long term.”
Equally, however, some advisors noted the difﬁcult position
Natural England advisors faced:
“Advisors are in the awkward position of trying to achieve
Government objectives, habitat and species protection and
encouraging land owners to enter the schemes. Advisors work
hard to get as much for the money as possible and farmers want
as much money as possible.” (Respondent id: QK59MK)
4.4.3. Payments, costs and income
Financial incentives are a central tool in steering farmers’ private
interests to provide particular public goods, but to achieve their
desired outcome payment levels must account for the opportunity
and transaction costs that farmers might incur on entering volun-
tary schemes (Cooper et al., 2009). Stewardship schemes provide
different standard payment amounts. Little consensus emerged in
our survey regarding respondents’ perspectives on whether clients
were satisﬁed with ELS payments (Supporting information Table
S9). There was a sense from some open-ended responses that
farmer expectations remain too high, with an attitude of ‘maxi-
mum gain and minimal cost/impact’. For example, as one advisor
remarked:
“They [i.e. farmers] would always be happier with more!”
(Respondent id: 7KMC97)
Other advisors observed that payments were sufﬁcient so long
as other farming business opportunities were not compromised:
“The £30/ha for ELS is ok provided there is not serious compe-
tition for more productive uses.” (Respondent id: 4DQMRP)
On the whole there was more general agreement among advi-
sors that clients were satisﬁed with the standard payment amounts
for OELS, UELS and HLS (Supporting information Table S9). Having
said that there were also clear differences of opinion, with one farm
advisor suggesting that farmers might be overpaid:“HLS payments are too high for the land based options in the
uplands. Extremely large annual payments for delivering very
little beneﬁt.” (Respondent id: LGQECT)
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Table  6
Emergent themes describing the possible reasons (R) for HLS application modiﬁcations.
Emergent themes R1(%, n = 187) R2(%, n = 116) R3(%, n = 64) R4(%, n = 13) Importance Across Reasons (%)
Changes in Natural England targets and priorities for HLS 26.7 22.4 21.8 0.0 23.7
Budgetary/cost/ﬁnancial constraints 22.9 18.9 12.5 30.8 20.3
Natural England advisor decision-making, viewpoint and knowledge 9.6 14.7 12.5 7.7 11.6
Other 8.7 12.9 14.1 15.4 11.1
Environmental option suitability 6.9 2.6 7.8 0.0 5.5
Farmers changed their minds 2.7 4.3 9.4 0.0 4.2
Conﬂict between HLS options and other scheme objectives 4.3 3.4 4.7 0.0 3.9
Farmer and NE negotiated changes 2.1 5.2 4.7 7.7 3.7
HLS  prescriptions too burdensome 1.6 5.2 4.7 15.4 3.7
Too little evidence to justify & differences of opinion concerning option
inclusion
1.6 4.3 4.7 7.7 3.2
Environmental option eligibility 4.2 0.9 0.0 0.0 2.4
Application mistakes 2.1 2.6 1.6 0.0 2.1
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Whilst in stark contrast, one respondent commented that the
resent level of HLS payments questions the scheme’s viability:
“HLS payments in recent years have been ‘trimmed’ down to the
state that with some schemes the annual return has been so low
as to make the scheme non-viable for the farmers.” (Respondent
id: 7KDH6Y)
However, by and large, with regards to payment satisfaction our
esults seem to accord with the 66% of UELS agreement holders that
onsidered scheme payments to be ‘generous’ or ‘sufﬁcient’ (CCRI,
012). Ultimately, as respondent (id: P8XVWR) indicates:
“If they [i.e. farmers] were not happy they would not enter an
agreement.”
Some studies claim farmers view Environmental Stewardship
s an income top-up and stabilizer (a form of income security),
articularly in instances where the farm business is vulnerable
Mills, 2012). In others, it has been argued that ELS entry may  incur
odest costs rather than adding to income (Udagawa et al., 2014).
ur results suggest that respondents straddle both of these per-
pectives, as advisors were generally split over whether payments
fforded their clients an adequate income stream or not (Support-
ng information Table S9), although one advisor did comment that:
“Some. . .farmers look on stewardship payments as income, but
I do point out to them that they are required to work for their
money − it’s not just a free hand-out.” (Respondent id: LDHK8D)
However, when speciﬁcally reﬂecting upon the connection
etween payments and costs (e.g., labour and materials), 56.6% of
dvisors suggested that clients considered payments insufﬁcient
o adequately cover changing input costs versus only 21.1% that
hought the contrary. This view was echoed in open-ended com-
ents, with some advisors stating payments did not reﬂect recent
escalations in commodity prices’ or ‘cost increases due to inﬂation’,
or example:
“Payments should be index linked. A payment of £30/ha might
have been acceptable 5 years ago, but costs have gone up a lot
yet scheme incomes have remained the same.” (Respondent id:
4A29YS)
Others emphasised that ELS payments were ‘not cost effective
or arable farmers’ and that ‘crop values and greening measures will
ake it harder to encourage renewals’, as one advisor outlined:“Payments are now seen as too low particularly in intensive
arable areas where a typical comment is that ‘it’s hardly worth
the hassle’.” (Respondent id: 6EATTB)0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1
0.9 0.0 7.7 1.3
1.7 1.6 7.7 1.3
This is supported by evidence indicating that cereal incomes
may  be unduly affected by entering ELS schemes (Udagawa et al.,
2014), as a respondent noted:
“The £30/ha on ELS was set at a time of low cereal prices and
was  to compensate for income forgone − in light of much higher
prices for crops this aspect needs re-visiting.” (Respondent id:
4NGVTB)
While this may  be the case other studies have suggested that the
percentage of farmers who regard payments as sufﬁcient to cover
their costs has grown since 2005 (FERA, 2013a).
Adopting a regional perspective revealed statistically signiﬁcant
heterogeneities in respondents’ views regarding scheme payment
levels as well as income and input costs (Supporting information
Table S10, Figs. S1 and S2). These regional patterns likely reﬂect
individual respondent experiences of speciﬁc farm-level socio-
economic characteristics as well as the distinctive rural and wider
economic circumstances encountered in these locations (see Farm
Business Survey).2 The implication seems to be that payment lev-
els ought to account for these differences, and thus better reﬂect
regional level conditions and farm business circumstances. Over-
all, advisors’ comments suggest that payment levels are a real issue
for farmers, in particular, whether the costs incurred actually make
entry level schemes unsustainable in the long-term (Udagawa et al.,
2014).
4.4.4. Compliance: penalties and sanctions
The successful provision of public goods relies on individuals
complying with contractual arrangements: this requires agree-
ments to have monitoring and conditionality elements (Hejnowicz
et al., 2014). We  queried respondents regarding elements of condi-
tionality (i.e., sanctions and penalties) and found that, although a
majority, only 51.4% agreed that their clients understood the extent
of the penalties that may  be applied should they fail to fully com-
ply with agreements (Supporting information Table S9). Notably, a
sizeable minority of advisors (33.9%) thought the opposite.
Additional commentary raised a number of issues; for example,
some advisors alleged that farmers and land managers, although
aware penalties could be applied in cases of non-compliance, were
often ignorant of the scope sanctions could take: partly as a conse-
quence of the rules being over-complicated and poorly explained:would knowingly ﬂout the rules and often farmers are found to
2 http://www.farmbusinesssurvey.co.uk/regional/.
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be non-compliant only as a result of them not being aware of all
of the requirements of the complicated scheme (particularly in
the case of HLS).” (Respondent id: YMEVCN)
On closer inspection this observation does seem rather puzzling,
urely the expectation is that part of the service advisors provide
ncludes spelling out the likely repercussions of non-compliance?
f an explanatory deﬁcit exists then surely this rests, in part, on the
houlders of farm advisors themselves? Certainly some advisors
ade the effort to inform their clients of non-compliance related
ssues but hinted at the fact that, in their opinion, ‘not. . .many other
dvisors do this’ and also with regards to farmers ‘it’s amazing how
uickly some of them forget!’.
Picking up on the latter point, ignorance and deliberate avoid-
nce have been identiﬁed as issues for farmers failing to meet
greement prescriptions, a reality that would seem to support the
ontention that agreement holders ought to have better access to
raining in order for them to more closely adhere to agreement con-
itions (FERA, 2013a). The provision of training has been shown to
ositively inﬂuence farmer behaviour and management activities
Jones et al., 2013).
Training, however, may  not be sufﬁcient because, as some
espondents disclosed, a number of their clients took a fairly
elaxed, even recalcitrant, stance towards compliance issues due
o poor monitoring and enforcement:
“Past monitoring of schemes has been poor − I think some farm-
ers believe they are unlikely to be caught breaching ELS/HLS
options and may  therefore continue existing practices (e.g.,
supplementary feeding, applying fertilizer) where the options
actually forbid this.” (Respondent id: QKUYGC)
At the opposite end of the spectrum, however, a number of
dvisors commented that punitive sanctions actually dissuaded
ndividuals from entering schemes as well as affecting the content
f agreements:
“The issue of the current punitive level of sanctions has put
off some farmers from going into schemes and has certainly
reduced an agreements ‘ambition’.” (Respondent id: E9DAB2)
Indeed, some respondents suggested that famers regarded sanc-
ions and penalties as the thin-end-of-the-wedge:
“Penalties imposed as a result of inspection are often seen as
pedantic and penny pinching for what appears to be minor
infringements.” (Respondent id: 6EATTB)
Others went further, proposing that sanctions and penalties
ere inappropriate, poorly formulated and incorrectly realised:
“The main problems with the sanctions and penalties are that
they come across as being draconian and in many cases incor-
rect and based on incorrect information either supplied by the
inspector or interpreted by the administration staff.” (Respon-
dent id: 97H33F)
and furthermore,
“Rules about penalties are over-complicated and poorly
explained. No allowance for intent − issues with extenuating or
mitigating circumstances are punished as severely as deliberate
non-compliance.” (Respondent id: 36E4W9)
Reﬂecting this view, only 19.9% of respondents agreed that their
lients regarded such sanctions as reasonable. Clearly, in the view of
dvisors, farmers regard the potential sanctions imposed by Nat-
ral England as disproportionate, with some suggesting that the
ault lies, in part, in the ‘uncertainty’ and ‘inconsistency’ with which
atural England tackle these issues.olicy 55 (2016) 240–256
Perhaps one avenue to help address these compliance issues
would be to adopt performance-based payment schemes: here pay-
ments are directly linked to the maximization of environmental
beneﬁts (Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013). Examples of agricultural
results-based payment programmes throughout Europe indicate
that they can be successful in generating beneﬁcial ecological,
economic and social outcomes (Burton and Schwarz, 2013), and
research in England also suggests that payment by results is posi-
tively perceived by farmers (Schroeder et al., 2013).
4.5. Moving forwards
A new round of CAP reforms (2014–2020) has been introduced
to provide a more streamlined, targeted and greener approach
to agricultural production and the rural environment (European
Commission, 2014). The degree of inter-pillar transfer from Pil-
lar 1 to Pillar 2 in England, as a consequence, is set to increase
from 9% to 15% over the next six years; and Defra has commit-
ted to allocate 87% of rural development funds to the environment
(Defra, 2014; Natural England, 2014). These revisions will see Envi-
ronmental Stewardship programmes eventually phased out and
replaced by the New Environmental Land Management Scheme or
NELMS for short (Natural England 2013). Although NELMS will be
implemented in early 2016, current Environmental Stewardship
agreement holders will still be delivering management under the
‘older’ system. The opportunity therefore exists for further sugges-
tions for reﬁnements to feed into the design and operationalization
of NELMS based on lessons learned under the Environmental Stew-
ardship programme.
Respondents were allowed to put forward four recommen-
dations that could enhance Environmental Stewardship uptake
and implementation (Table 7). Many recommendations were sug-
gested and thematic analysis identiﬁed several broad themes, the
most common of which centred on: reorganising Environmental
Stewardship delivery (22.5%); simplifying scheme processes and
procedures (19.5%); providing more information regarding envi-
ronmental option management and implementation (14.3%), and
improving the targeting of schemes (9.6%). Indeed, the views of
respondents also echo those of Lastra-Bravo et al. (2015) who  high-
light the importance of ‘institutional design’ and ‘stable policy’
for aiding farmer engagement with, and adoption of, future agri-
environmental schemes.
Overall, recommendations provided by respondents connected
with the themes central to the NEMLS programme (e.g., ‘delivering
outcomes at a landscape scale’; ‘a participative and collaborative
approach’; ‘outcome focused performance assessment’; ‘ﬂexi-
ble and adaptable’; ‘locally tailored advice and training’; and
‘simpliﬁcation’—see NELMS Project, 2013), as well as reﬂecting
research focusing on the design principles of future agri-
environment schemes (FERA, 2013b). Respondent suggestions also
aligned with those expressed in recent Defra consultations on CAP
reform (Defra, 2014), which included the need to address ‘the risk
of complexity’ and the importance of ‘targeting as a means to direct
option choice’.
5. Conclusions
Our survey has provided an important exploratory assessment
of the English experience of Environmental Stewardship viewed
through the lens of independent farm advisors: the views of whom
are under-represented in the existing literature. In this regard, we
have both strengthened and expanded upon the current literature
concerning AES, and Environmental Stewardship in particular, by
highlighting a broad range of farm advisor views that have not
previously been, in this format at least, addressed or assessed.
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Table  7
Recommendations (R) for improvements in Environmental Stewardship delivery and implementation.
Emergent themes R1(%, n = 168) R2(%, n = 92) R3(%, n = 56) R4(%, n = 27) Overall popularity (%)
Reorganization of Environmental Stewardship delivery (e.g. alternative ways to
improve on-the-farm provision)
25.6 16.3 28.6 11.1 22.5
Simpliﬁcation of Environmental Stewardship processes (e.g. streamline HLS
application requirements)
26.2 17.4 7.1 11.1 19.5
Environmental Stewardship scheme options (e.g. degree of ﬂexibility in option
implementation)
10.1 21.7 17.9 7.4 14.3
Targeting Environmental Stewardship (e.g. tailoring to meet local environmental
needs)
8.3 13.0 8.9 7.4 9.6
Natural England and Natural England Advisors (e.g. knowledge; interaction with
farmers)
8.9 9.8 3.6 11.1 8.5
Environmental Stewardship payments (e.g. reassess payments to reﬂect
environmental option requirements and changing labour and input costs)
9.5 6.5 3.6 0.0 7.0
Other  5.4 4.4 7.1 18.5 6.4
Consultation, dialogue and support (e.g. contact with industry; ES support provision
for farmers)
4.2 2.2 5.4 11.1 4.4
Agent/advisor training (e.g. ensuring agents are suitability qualiﬁed and
knowledgeable)
0.6 2.2 1.8 14.8 2.3
Mapping (e.g. improve online mapping tools) 0.6 3.3 1.8 3.7 1.8
Farmer focused (e.g. consideration of farmer viewpoints and operational constraints) 0.0 0.0 8.9 3.7 1.8
Environmental Stewardship scheme reinvention (e.g. establishing and dissolving
schemes too frequently)
0.6 0.0 3.6 0.0 0.9
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Scheme complementarity (e.g. reduce conﬂicts between different but
co-implemented/managed environmental schemes)
Our ﬁndings indicate that farm advisors exhibit a wide range
f expertise and experience, and that in some cases regionality,
xpertise and gender can play a part in inﬂuencing farm advi-
or perspectives and experience of Environmental Stewardship
chemes. We  have also shed some light on the facilitating role farm
dvisor advice plays in the preparation of Environmental Steward-
hip agreements, and shown that farm advisors regard what we
erm the ‘knowledge-exchange encounter’ as a crucial aspect of
his facilitative function.
Initial ﬁndings suggest that farm advisors face a difﬁcult bal-
ncing act: preparing agreements based around the needs of their
lients on the one hand, whilst on the other, ensuring submitted
greements are not at odds with Natural England requirements. In
he view of most respondents, there is an inherent tension between
armer and Natural England objectives. This would seem to connect
o the ﬁnding that, in the eyes of respondents, although farmers
isplay a broad range of extrinsic and intrinsic motivations for
ngaging in Environmental Stewardship agreements, they are pri-
arily motivated by ﬁnancially-oriented reasons. And, in addition,
hey demonstrate a proclivity to make decisions about the environ-
ental management content of agreements based on how closely
his aligns with current on-farm practices and the farm business
ore generally.
Equally, given that famers respect, and are open to, the advice
hey externally contract, farm advisors may  have a decisive role in
uiding farmer decision-making processes. Advisors, in this sense,
otentially occupy an inﬂuential ‘soft power’ position. This has the
rospect of going in one of two directions, either: advisors can
ncourage farmers to undertake environmentally ambitious agree-
ents that build on intrinsic ‘green’ motivations or, taking the
pposite stance, draw on farmers’ extrinsic motivations and pro-
uce agreements requiring minimal changes to on-farm practices
rimarily beneﬁting existing farm business arrangements.
Allied to these discussions are the observations that many
espondents noted, namely, with particular reference to the HLS
ier of Environmental Stewardship, that their clients found HLS
pplication processes too burdensome and overly complex, a view
hey also concurred with, pointing to the need to simplify and
treamline the system. Respondents suggested that the complex-
ty of programme arrangements and processes may  function as
 barrier for farmers and land managers: potentially acting as0.0 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.6
0.0 1.1 1.8 0.0 0.6
a contributing factor to decrease the environmental ambition of
agreements and increase the likelihood that the management
practices incorporated into agreements mirror those of the ‘farm
system’. Perhaps it is the very labour intensive nature of produc-
ing an HLS agreement that provides one explanatory factor for the
observation that respondents felt they ought (and were entitled)
to be involved in the HLS revision process, a process in which they
have no legitimate authority to intervene.
Overall, the narrative we  have presented suggests that the
knowledge-exchange encounter is not a simple straightforward
interaction. Rather, advisers’ opinions and comments suggest that
there are often important tensions between the goals and agendas
of the principal agents involved in preparing, implementing and
delivering Environmental Stewardship.
In addition, our survey has also highlighted a feeling among
advisors that, for farmers, scheme payments present a real issue,
particularly because management interventions can have a con-
siderable impact on overall farm income and; furthermore, may
not adequately account for all the costs farmers incur and appro-
priately reﬂect regional socio-economic differences. Farm advisors
also indicated, and to some extent this may  be linked to the issues
of scheme complexity we have previously discussed, that there
are challenges associated with matters of scheme compliance and
sanctions. Among respondents there was  a general feeling that a
signiﬁcant minority of their clients were not fully aware of scheme-
related penalties and sanctions, and in some cases adopted a fairly
relaxed stance towards non-compliance. Such matters pose real
issues for how enforcement works and the environmental man-
agement effectiveness of schemes, but also, raise important issues
regarding proper informed consent (i.e., that agreement holders
should be fully informed about, and understand, their contractual
obligations at the outset of the process).
Looking ahead, to ensure the success of future AES programmes,
teasing out the issues we have started to shed light on in this
paper will be necessary, in particular: focusing in more depth
on the relationships and tensions existing between farmers, farm
advisors and Natural England. This would seem to be the most fer-
tile ground for uncovering those factors determining the overall
content, implementation and performance of AES agreements. Ulti-
mately, if NELMS are to fruitfully replace and build on the successes
of Environmental Stewardship, as well as avoid any of their pitfalls,
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hen the issues raised by farm advisors in this survey will be impor-
ant food for thought in developing effective schemes that work
n practice. Speciﬁcally, by acknowledging the importance of the
ifferent agendas and dialogues occurring between farmers, pri-
ate advisors and Natural England; ensuring that participation and
nvironmental ambition pays and contracts are properly enforced;
nd that the operation and implementation of schemes is simple,
traightforward, easy to put into practice, accommodates farm pro-
uction and does not alienate potential participants.
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